Images come to mind as we read a novel. After weeks practicing a new dance move we can’t quite land, something clicks, and we execute it without thinking. Telling a story about a recently deceased loved one helps us come to terms with their absence. In his multi-layered novel “Memoirs of an Anti-Semite” Gregor Von Rezzorit writes “ … experiences lodged in me as “mood motifs , ” and only after the mood had taken shape did they become clear images and recollections”. (p. 93)
All of these phenomena relate to the idea that we experience life in multiple registers, which are connected partially and to a limited degree. Our brains process many different kinds of information— sensations, movements, images in different modalities, emotions and words—at the same time. Sometimes, these different kinds of processing connect to one another. We see this in the example of the images that come to mind reading a novel. At other times, these different kinds of information don’t connect. A dance instructor tells us, or shows us, how the move is executed, but actually executing it—and gracefully—is a different matter. Moods remain dark shadows; clear images do not emerge. These various phenomena, and they ways they relate to one another, are the subject of our research.
The Referential Process (RP) Project looks at the many different types of experience that people have, and focuses particularly on the question of how humans may connect experience with language, in communication with others, and in thought for themselves.
The theory has been developed in the context of current work in cognitive psychology, psycholinguistics, psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, and is compatible with areas of neuroscience, including social neuroscience. The major applications of the theory thus far have been in the area of psychotherapy, particularly psychodynamic therapy.
The multiple code theory had its origins in Dual Code Theory (DCT), developed by Paivio (1971) and applied to psychoanalytic theory by Bucci (1985). In the preceding period of behaviorist psychology that remained dominant at least until the 1950s, verbal representation had been seen as the basis of human mental functioning. It was considered somewhat radical and revolutionary when researchers such as Paivio, Shepard, Kosslyn and others introduced the notion that thought may operate in the form of imagery as well as words, and provided evidence for this claim.
Multiple Code Theory (MCT), introduced by Bucci (1997), went beyond DCT in several ways: emphasizing the fundamental distinctions between symbolic and nonsymbolic modes of thought; focusing on the role of bodily and sensory functions within nonsymbolic experience; characterizing the processes by which the different modes are connected, as well as the limited and partial nature of these connections; and accounting for the necessary role of emotional experience in cognitive functions. The role of imagery as proposed in DCT is now generally accepted, the claims of MCT concerning the systematic nature of nonsymbolic processing, occurring within and outside of awareness, and the associated ways of communicating and understanding experience are gaining in acceptance. A brief outline of the multiple code theory including a description of symbolic and nonsymbolic experience is given below, along with a diagram of the model; also see Bucci, 1997 for a detailed discussion.
Symbols are defined as discrete entities that refer to other entities and may be combined to generate new forms; they may be words (verbal symbols) or images (nonverbal symbols):
Words have the power to communicate experience across potentially unlimited domains of time and place. Verbal language also underlies the processes of logic that enable organization of experience – identifying and labeling what belongs in particular categories and what is excluded. Human scientific achievement has been attributed to these particular and unique powers that are not available in other species. We note that spoken and written words are the forms of representation that are directly observable and measurable; this accounts in part for the early dominance of verbal language in behaviorist psychology.
Symbols may also be images, discrete entities in any sensory modality. Like words, images refer to other entities and may be combined to generate new forms; in contrast to words they are shareable to only a limited degree. Visual and to a lesser degree auditory images are most readily represented in shareable form. Cave drawings were perhaps the first visual symbols; specific instruments in Prokofiev’s ‘Peter and the Wolf’ represent particular animals in auditory form. Images may also occur in the modalities of taste, smell and touch, i.e. memories of a sensory experience may occur in the absence of an activating stimulus, but these are internal to the experiencer, not directly representable as shareable imagery. Helen Keller has communicated images of texture and smell through her vivid language but can not share her experience directly in its own modality. In contrast, the visual imagery of Picasso’s Guernica directly evokes the painter’s experience of pain and terror in the viewer.
Nonsymbolic (or subsymbolic) processing is based on gradients of experience rather than discrete elements. The various forms of nonsymbolic experience occur continuously and simultaneously in multiple channels at varying levels of awareness, accompanying the symbolic forms. We respond to shadings and shadows of light and color, to changes in a facial expression or in the sounds of a voice, usually without being able to label or categorize them. This applies for all sensory modalities, and for bodily and motoric experience.
This type of function operates along with the symbolic mode in all forms of art; in athletic skills; and in creative scientific and mathematical work, as well as in everyday activities such as cooking or riding a bicycle or driving a car. and is. The nonsymbolic aspects of experience are central in interpersonal interactions and particularly crucial in the relationships of psychotherapy. In their interactions, therapists – and presumably patients as well – are constantly attentive to changes in the facial expression, body movement, tone of voice, and speech rhythms of the other, and modulate their own vocal tones and movements in response to these. The therapist is also attentive to their own bodily responses as providing information about the patient, about themselves, and about their interactions. All of this crucial information is provided in nonsymbolic form, often in the background of awareness, sometimes taking center stage in an interaction. The role of nonsymbolic information may come to awareness in periods where its nature changes as in the experiences of online therapy during the recent covid pandemic. Therapists became directly aware of such experience when it was radically changed , and changed their own ways of responding, in some cases without awareness or intent. (For studies of these effects, see Christian and Negri, 2023).
Nonsymbolic and symbolic modes of thought and communication do not occur in isolation; both occur continuously with varying degrees of coordination between them. Some processes operate systematically as combined or transitional functions, continuously connecting nonsymbolic and symbolic forms, within the nonverbal domain, in a variety of ways and to varying degrees. Some of these are listed in the MCT diagram as transitional forms.
Movements may contribute to symbolic communication through representational gestures in dance or accompanying speech, e.g., speakers will generally use depictive gestures to describe images such as a spiral staircase. Some kinaesthetic and somatic experiences such as particular bodily sensations may operate as images. A young adolescent learns to recognize certain internal bodily sensations that help him to anticipate and regulate his behavior and avoid dangerous situations.
Nonsymbolic processes, including sensory, somatic and motoric functions that become associated into categories may serve transitional functions between nonsymbolic and symbolic modes. Tennis players may learn that there is a set of situations in which they can expect the ball to arrive in a particular way and can prepare for it in their movements; the child learns that certain actions or expressions of their parent carry particular danger and can prepare to protect themselves.
From a different perspective, the sound patterns of language bring nonsymbolic processes into the language domain. These include speech rhythms, pitch levels and vocal modulation, as well as devices such as rhyming and onomatopoeia. Such patterning applies in the construction of written language as well as in spoken, and in prose as well as in poetry. Poetic meter and rhyme scheme are forms of highly codified nonsymbolic information that, within oral traditions, have been used as mnemonic aids. The writer Colm Tóibín has referred to the essential nature of the rhythm of written language:
Once Tóibín has figured out what he calls “the rhythm” of a novel . . . he doesn’t do much rewriting. A book’s style, he said, “has to seem unforced and natural”. If he has not found the proper rhythm, he explained, “the rewriting within a rhythm will emphatically not solve the problem”. (Interview of Tóibín by D.T. Max, The New Yorker, September 20, 2021, p. 53)
The basic process of connecting nonverbal experience and words, the Referential Process, which is central to our project, will be discussed in a separate section.
Both nonsymbolic and symbolic mental processing may operate within and outside of awareness. Symbolic forms, particularly words, are generally experienced as dominant in conscious, waking life, in talking or writing and in thought, but may also operate outside of awareness. We may wake in the morning with a word or idea that has been eluding us and that emerged during sleep; we may learn to invite productive thought by turning attention away as Poincaré is reported to have done in his famous mathematical discovery (Hadamard, 1954); we have vivid and detailed imagery in dreams that we can recall and report.
Nonsymbolic representations of movement and sensory experience operate continuously at varying levels of awareness from minimal low level wakefulness to focused attention, depending on both internal state and external circumstances (Damasio, 1994; Bucci, 2002). For most people in normal health, walking does not require attention; the toddler or the elderly person whose sense of balance is impaired will attend more directly to their movements. (Various politicians have been characterized as having difficulty walking and chewing gum at the same time.) Professional tennis players carry out many movements while thinking several plays ahead; but when they are serving a ball will focuses attention intensely on the movement; attention is necessary for the organization and direction of the swing. If there is a sudden noise in the crowd that diverts their attention, they will halt in the middle of their swing, catch the ball, and wait. The driver who has been essentially on automatic mental pilot in familiar routes must direct attention to the process of entering a highway or changing lanes, often pausing in an ongoing conversation to focus on it. Neither the tennis player nor the driver will explicitly compute any of the variables that are involved while carrying out the actions; the mental organization that is required will operate systematically, within the focus of the nonsymbolic mode. The automatic change lane features now in some cars required complex engineering but are not generally considered fully adequate or safe for some unpredictable situations that can be managed more safely by the human nonsymbolic computational system.
Historically, tradition in psychoanalysis has focused on making unconscious experience conscious. Multiple code theory offers a different perspective that emphasizes the relationship between different forms of experience, the nonsymbolic and symbolic modes. Both of these modes of experience operate to different extents, within and outside of awareness.
In current views, neuroscientists characterize memory and thought in terms of a network of nodes, only a small part of which can be activated at any particular time. Multiple code theory can be regarded as a cognitive analog of these views; the various nodes may or may not be accessible to awareness. The contents of the network may include images of places or smells or sounds, connected to words to varying degrees. There are some experiences in both nonsymbolic and symbolic forms that are avoided because they activate traces of pain, leading to functional disconnections within the network of nodes. Such habitual avoidance based on past experiences may lead to difficulties in current life; these are often the difficulties that bring people to treatment.
From the multiple code perspective, the goal of the psychoanalytic process involves finding ways of building new connections within the network of nodes. In treatment, the patient (or client) may come to allow elements of the painful experience to emerge in their associations and interactions, gradually adding new nodes to the network of experience and enabling actions and perceptions that have been previously avoided.
The relation of the concepts of multiple code theory to an understanding of the psychoanalytic process and our ways of studying the treatment process will be discussed in more detail in separate sections. Here we have introduced the multiple code claims concerning the central role of connecting different formats of experience in adaptive mental life. This leads as well to a broader claim that goes beyond the remediation of pathology, a new perspective on the role of a psychoanalytic understanding of the mind in providing a foundation for a more coherent sense of self and new ways of relating to others. These claims will be addressed more fully in the sections on emotion schemas and the referential process.
In multiple code theory, the organization of emotional experience is based on the concept of ‘emotion schemas’; these are particular types of memory schemas that incorporate subsymbolic and symbolic forms (Bucci 1997, 2002). They begin to develop from the beginning of life, well before language is acquired. They are built as clusters of memories of events of one’s life in which subsymbolic sensory, visceral and motoric processes are activated in relation to different people in a variety of contexts. Later, language may be incorporated in the schemas to some degree.
Concepts of mental schemas in their various forms have been used in philosophy at least since Kant (1781) and in psychology at least since Head and Holmes (1911). Head focused on somatosensory representations, and argued that impressions produced by incoming sensory impulses are interpreted in the contexts of existing standards or ‘body schemas’. In the context of developmental psychology, Piaget (1926) defined the concept of schema as a general cognitive structure that links multiple representations of an experience, and alters interpretation of new information.
Bartlett introduced the concept of memory schemas as representations of experience that are constantly developing and focused on the processes by which representations are changed -‘reconstructed’ – with each new activation. This view contrasted with the trace theory of memory that was dominant at the time and that involved storage and retrieval of experiences as initially encoded. Bartlett’s notion of memory schema, emphasizing the constantly changing nature of memory in the context of new experience was highly influential in the work of cognitive science from the 1970s onward (Minsky (1975); Rumelhart (1980), Schank and Abelson (1977)
The concept of emotion schema as introduced by Bucci builds on Bartlett’s concept and on the more recent work of cognitive science, but is distinguished from the overall category of memory schemas in two major ways:
The view of emotional experience as incorporated in the concept of emotion schema is also compatible with current theories of emotion as outlined by Scherer (2005), Russell (2003) and others. (See Bucci, Maskit and Murphy 2015)
Emotional schema therapy was introduced by Leahy as a modification of Beck’s cognitive model of psychopathology and therapy. Beck’s model was focused on distorted beliefs about oneself and others; Leahy’s ‘Emotional schema therapy’ focuses on biases in interpretation of emotions that can result in problematic behaviors. The therapy provides a wide range of procedures that focus on changing a client’s beliefs about emotions, increasing their ability to interpret their emotions and changing their expectations about their life experiences.
This contrasts with the psychodynamic formulation of the treatment process, as seen in the context of multiple code theory. From this perspective, the process of psychotherapy depends on the activation of the affective core of an emotion schema in a new interpersonal context. This enables more adaptive schemas to develop. The basic structure of the emotion schema can be seen in a wide range of clinical concepts including internalized object relations (Klein, Kernberg and others), Representations of Interactions that have been Generalized (RIGS) Stern (1985); also in the basic psychoanalytic concept of transference (Freud, 1912); self states (in the relational psychoanalytic approach); and the Jungian concept of complexes.
People experience the world in multiple ways from multiple perspectives. These different ways of experiencing the world are built on the events of one’s life, in the context of the particular nature of one’s bodily and mental powers. We are constantly suffused with a flow of experience in multiple channels. One way we represent these experiences is via the digital, sequential organization of language. Linguistic articulation allows us to come to a fuller understanding of our experiences, and to communicate that fuller understanding of our experiences to others.
From the multiple code perspective, the process of psychotherapy depends to a large extent on the capability of the patient to communicate inner experience in verbal form, and in doing so, activate emotional understanding in the therapist. Conversely, the psychotherapy process is further dependent on the therapist’s capacity to generate language on the basis of their own experience in relation to the patient. The process of connecting experience and language, which we term the Referential Process, has been studied most directly in psychotherapy, but is active in all forms of written and spoken communication, as well as in thought.
The connection of experience to language occurs through the Referential Process. In the terms of Multiple Code Theory, the referential process connects the various kinds of symbolic and nonsymbolic information which make up an individuals emotion schemas. We have identified three major functions of this process: Arousal; Symbolizing; and Reflecting/Reorganizing. (See Bucci, 2011; Bucci, Maskit & Murphy, 2015).
Arousal of a schema: The process begins with arousal of the bodily components of an emotion schema. The schema may be activated by a smell, a song, a sight or other event, sometimes without the person being directly aware of the source of the activation. Emotion may be communicated on the subsymbolic level in this phase, through modalities such as body movement, gesture and facial expression, without the experience being formulated in verbal form.
The Arousal function may be expressed in various ways. This stage of the process may be observed in a speaker’s speech rhythms and vocal tones, in their struggle to find the words for their experience. The function may be minimal when the speaker has some immediate access to a particular experience, however. In some cases the function may not lead to symbolizing when the activation of a schema is blocked.
Symbolizing: connection to the symbolic mode: The symbolizing function provides the major carrier of the explicit contents of emotional communication. The speaker or writer describes an image or event that is an instantiation of an activated emotion schema. This may be an autobiographical memory, with varying degrees of veridicality; or a construction, such as a fantasy or daydream built on elements of a memory. The listener or reader is likely to feel some degree of bodily and sensory activation in response to such a description of a specific event. This is the core, and necessary component of the process, the means by which nonsymbolic sensory and somatic experience is expressed.
Reflecting/Reorganizing: Following the reliving of an event, and its verbal description, the speaker (or writer) may enter a more reflective, logical mode. The speaker may recognize relationships or distinctions among events that had not previously been identified, and may then be able to modulate future reactions. In some instances, reflections may include generalized descriptions, including emotion category labels.
The R/R function of the referential process has been identified and studied primarily in the context of psychotherapy, where self reflection and changes in emotional organization are primary goals of the process. The language of this function may also be found in literature, in the voice of a character or perhaps in the author’s characterizations.